Urban migration promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemmas of pollution #

Jacques Bara, Fernando P Santos, Paolo Turrini

11:30 Monday in 3Q16.

Part of the Game theory and agent-based models session.

Abstract #

In this talk we discuss spatial public goods games in which agents either pollute (defectors) or clean (cooperators) their local area and can migrate to empty sites within range. We ask whether migration alone reduces the pollution felt by individuals, even keeping the number of polluters constant. Analytically and through agent-based simulations, we show that polluters encourage eco-friendly neighbours to migrate away, eventually clustering with other cooperators. We conclude that migration ultimately reduces the pollution felt per-capita, while providing an extra advantage for cooperation. Our results reveal that movement alone can have a positive impact on long-term payoffs in those multiagent systems where space is a key feature of the interaction.